CNN Newsroom: Global View

home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search

/ CNN Newsroom: Global View / CNN Newsroom: Global View.iso / txt / ch / ch0192.002 < prev next >

Wrap

Text File | 1994-05-02 | 36.1 KB | 692 lines

<text> <title> The Shift in Palestinian Thinking </title> <article> <hdr> Current History, January 1992 The Shift in Palestinian Thinking </hdr> <body> By Muhammad Muslih--teaches political science at C.W. Post College, Long Island University. Another 1948 is in the making for the Palestinians. With the end of the Persian Gulf war, only 70,000 of the 400,000 Palestinians who lived in Kuwait before the Iraqi invasion in August 1990 remain, facing an uncertain future. The 250,000 who fled to Jordan during the Gulf crisis now live in a state of homelessness, joblessness, and despair. Palestinian financial losses since the outbreak of the Gulf crisis are estimated at $10 billion; this figure excludes the loss of Palestinian assets in Kuwait and the costs the war imposed on the Palestinian economy in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Key Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have basically reversed the 1974 Rabat summit resolution, which recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Palestine question, once at the top of the Arab agenda--at least rhetorically--has been deferred, though not abandoned. Why? The answer lies in the way PLO chairman Yasir Arafat and senior PLO officials guided the ship of Palestinian politics during the Gulf crisis. Throughout the crisis several Arafats were in evidence. There was the democratic Arafat, who had to take the wishes of his constituency into consideration; the single-minded Arafat, who dismissed the better judgement of his most senior colleagues; and the overconfident Arafat, who mistakenly believed that with his limited resources he could act as a mediator between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Saddam's Arab enemies. Above all, there was the Arafat who was perceived as the "legitimizer" of Saddam's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Which aspect of Arafat's behavior best conformed to reality? Certainly, there was overwhelming support for Saddam among the Palestinians living in Jordan and the occupied territories, not because he invaded Kuwait, but because he stood up to the United States, Israel's protector and supporter. As far as the Palestinians were concerned, the fact that United States President George Bush mobilized the world to reverse Iraq's seizure of Kuwait but had done nothing to force Israel to comply with United Nations (UN) resolutions concerning the occupied territories was the epitome of selective morality. Moreover, Saddam misled the Palestinians into believing that Iraq had a deterrent against nuclear Israel, thus preparing the ground to end Israel's occupation. As Palestinian journalist Hanna Siniora explained the Palestinians' positive reaction to Saddam, "When a drowning man sees land disappear slowly in front of him, and suddenly a man throws him a rope, he will not ask who that man is." The Palestinians were drowning before the Gulf crisis. The end of the cold war signaled the further strengthening of Israeli hegemony. The prospect of a "Greater" Israel--that is, one that included the territory now under Israeli control in the West Bank--was becoming more of a reality, thanks primarily to the influx of over 200,000 Soviet Jews. Moreover, "transfer" policy, which many Israeli right-wingers interpret as the expulsion of the Palestinians from the territories, was a topic of public discussion; peace-for-peace rather than the land-for-peace formula became the official policy of the Israeli government; settlement activity in the occupied territories was escalating in leaps and bounds; and dialogue between the United States and the PLO was frozen. All this took place against a backdrop of Arab acquiescence and inaction. This explains, but does not necessarily justify, the pro-Saddam reaction of the Palestinians in the occupied territories and in Jordan. Arafat, who was by then more mindful of the preferences of his West Bank and Gaza constituency then he had been five or ten years earlier, rode the popular tide in the territories and took a pro-Iraq stance. Disagreement with Arafat Another aspect of Arafat's behavior was that he uncharacteristically dismissed not only the advice of some of his closest aides, but also the desires of the Palestinians in Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf. These included Salah Khalaf, the number two man in the PLO (who was assassinated at the start of the Gulf war), and many Palestinian intellectuals who wanted the PLO to distance itself from Saddam. When it did not, they strongly opposed Arafat's handling of the crisis. Many Palestinians living in Kuwait and the Gulf, especially those with business interests or government positions, were also critical of Arafat. Activists from the mainstream Fatah faction of the PLO in Kuwait did not simply condemn the Iraqi invasion; some of them even joined the Kuwaiti underground. Those who disagreed with Arafat argued that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a violation of the principles from which the Palestinian cause drew its legitimacy and moral strength. They also noted that the Palestinians, vulnerable as they were, should avoid taking sides in inter-Arab conflicts and that Kuwait had always supported the Palestinians and had opened its borders to skilled and unskilled Palestinian labor. Finally, even the appearance of a mild tilt toward Iraq would dry up Gulf financial support for the Palestinians, thus eroding the Palestinian economic base. Why did Arafat choose to ignore these points? Some say the reason was Saddam's seduction of Arafat at least two years before the crisis with facilities, logistics, and the unrealistic promise of deterring Israel. Others mention the emergence of a more militant and uncompromising Israel. But there is an additional reason. The PLO, which emerged and operates in exile, has traditionally articulated the political desires of the Palestinians in the diaspora. With the onset of the intifada (uprising) in the occupied territories in December 1987, the balance started to shift to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. While the Palestinians have always viewed themselves as an indivisible political community, the intifada forced the PLO leadership in Tunis to pay closer attention to the views of the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. The overriding concern of these Palestinians is to end the occupation, even if it entails recognition of Israel. With his view fixed on the Palestinians in the occupied territories and in Jordan, Arafat thus distanced himself from the largely anti-Saddam position of the Palestinians living in the Gulf states. He instead adopted an ambivalent attitude: support for Iraq as the challenger of foreign forces, as well as opposition to Iraq as the invader of Kuwait. In so doing, he assumed that his behavior would ensure continued Palestinian support in Jordan and the occupied territories without alienating the Arab Gulf countries. The rapid unfolding of events proved the second half of his assumption deadly wrong. Arafat ended up a leader with a diminished constituency, since his sizable base in Kuwait literally vanished. At the same time, he lost his Arab allies in the Gulf. Another example of Arafat's miscalculations was his attempt to mediate between Iraq and the Arab governments aligned against it. His behavior in this regard may have stemmed both from a desire to localize the Gulf crisis and solve it within the Arab "family," and his wish to gain political capital from his efforts if he was successful. Arafat, however, failed to see that mediation required that all the parties involved share a spirit of genuine cooperation. Saddam, at least as of August 3, 1990, when a majority of the Arab League members adopted a resolution condemning Iraq's invasion the day before and calling for an unconditional withdrawal, adamantly refused to pull his troops out of Kuwait. According to an August 1991 Jordanian White Paper, Saddam agreed to withdraw if the Arab League did not condemn Iraq or invite foreign powers to force a withdrawal. (White Paper on Jordan and the Gulf Crisis, August 1990-March 1991--Amman: The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1991, pp. 4-5.) Likewise, the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia were stubbornly determined to keep the door of negotiation with Saddam closed, either of their own volition or as a result of United States pressure. What they sought was Iraq's unconditional capitulation. Arafat should have known better. Never in the modern history of inter-Arab relations had the line been drawn so clearly between two opposing camps--in this case the anti-Saddam camp and the camp of those who chose to stay outside it. Sitting on the fence was not allowed, nor was neutrality. Did Saddam Need Arafat? What about the charge that Arafat's behavior strengthened Saddam's resolve and legitimized his claims? The rulers of the Gulf countries certainly believed this. (Senior diplomats from the Gulf have often expressed their belief in this charge in discussions with the author.) However, in many political affairs reality is what we believe in and not what is there; it is hard to believe that Saddam needed an Arafat to harden his position or to give his actions a cloak of legitimacy. From the beginning, Saddam was driven by his own vision. He was in full control of the Iraqi state, which is what mattered most in his search for legitimacy. Saddam was unyielding and determined to turn his back on anyone who suggested withdrawal from Kuwait. According to a senior Arab official, Saddam told Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh that he would not be welcome in Baghdad if he recommended an Iraqi withdrawal because that would run counter to Iraq's nationalist stand. When Arafat reportedly implored Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, pointing to the destruction that awaited Iraq if it did not, Saddam replied that if the Palestinians, with their limited military resources, were able to hold out for 88 days against the Israeli forces during Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, then Iraq, with its greater military resources, should be able to stand fast for a longer time. These exchanges illustrate Saddam's frame of mind. Throughout the crisis, Arafat's worst mistake was to follow rather than lead Palestine public opinion. The PLO leader should have taken a stand against Palestinian popular opinion and supported the Kuwaiti position. The Reactive Trend The Gulf war and its aftermath catalyzed a heated debate among Palestinians that resulted in demands for political and organizational changes in the PLO. At the same time, the PLO's grip on Palestinian politics began to loosen. Two trends in Palestinian political thought developed: a reactive and a proactive policy. Those advocating a reactive policy believed that because of the PLO's weak position after the Gulf war, it should refrain from any bold initiatives. Instead, the group should adopt a wait-and-see attitude, and simply react to initiatives from the United States or others. The first important initiative they faced was a United States proposal for a Middle East peace conference under joint Soviet-American sponsorship. To strengthen the PLO's negotiating position at such a conference, advocates of a reactive approach argued that the PLO should restore its prewar Arab alliances and reinvigorate its 1988 peace strategy, which was based on recognition of Israel, acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, and creation of a Palestinian state confederated with Jordan and confined to the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza (UN Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in November, 1967, calls for Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied during the June 1967 Six Day War (East Jerusalem, and the West Bank, Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula, and Gaza Strip), and for Arab states to recognize Israel's "right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries"--the so-called land for peace formula.) Among the policy's chief advocates were Arafat, PLO Executive Committee members Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin), Yasir Abd Rabbuh, Suleiman al-Najjab, and Faruq al-Qaddumi. The PLO's efforts to seek reconciliation and a return to the Arab mainstream were evident in the organization's stepped-up effort to rebuild its bridges with Egypt and Syria. PLO efforts to improve relations with Egypt took the form of meetings between senior Egyptian and PLO officials on the proposed Middle East peace conference. Thanks to the mediation efforts of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, a summit meeting took place between Arafat and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Benghazi, Libya, in August 1991. The meeting returned the Egyptian-Palestinian relationship to where it had been before the Gulf crisis, and restored the PLO's Arab credentials, which had been tarnished during the Gulf crisis. The visit also helped end Egypt's isolation and paved the way for its reintegration into the Arab and Islamic worlds after being condemned for signing a separate peace agreement with Israel in 1979. The PLO was motivated to improve relations with the regime of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad after eight years of bitter feuding by three objectives: to use Damascus as a channel to the Gulf states; to thwart attempts by the United States and the Gulf governments to exclude the PLO from the Middle East peace process; and to coordinate with Syria a common stand before the Middle East peace conference. The Syrian government, not the PLO, took the initiative in improving relations. The reason? Syria has a Camp David complex. It wanted to make sure that no Arab state would reach a separate peace with Israel, or reach an agreement with it regarding functional issues, before Israel committed itself to withdraw from Arab land. Whatever working relationship emerges between Syria and the PLO on the tactical level will be temporary, since their long-term goals are different. The PLO wants a freeze on Jewish settlements, even if it entails a separate arrangement with Israel. Syria sees no incentive to move in that direction, since the Israeli government is adamantly opposed to territorial compromise on the Golan Heights. An interest in reconciliation was also evident in the PLO's attitude toward the peace conference and in its reaction to the conditions laid down by the United States and Israel for participation in the conference. Since April 1991, the PLO had allowed a Palestinian delegation from the occupied territories to meet with United States Secretary of State James Baker 3rd several times, despite Baker's opposition to a Palestinian state or any role for the PLO. (The most prominent members of the Palestinian delegation were Hanan Ashrawi, Zakaria al-Agha, Faisal al-Husseini, and Sari Nusseibeh.) That same month, the PLO Central Council recommended the "opening of new horizons" for restoring the dialogue with the United States. (The United States has made it clear that it is not yet ready to reopen its official dialogue with the PLO, which was broken off in 1990.) In June, Arafat accepted American proposals regarding the participation of Palestinians from the occupied territories in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the peace conference, thus dropping his insistence on independent Palestinian representation; and in September the Palestine National Council (PNC), the Palestinian parliament-in-exile, authorized Palestinian involvement in the peace conference. The PNC stopped short of sanctioning Palestinian participation on the basis of Israel's conditions, which were: any Palestinian delegation must be formed by non-PLO Palestinians from the occupied territories; members of the delegation would not have any direct connection with East Jerusalem; and members should not have formal links with the PLO. The Proactive Trend Two groups, one secular and the other Islamist, advocate a proactive policy for the PLO; that is, the organization should initiate new ideas and policies, and not simply react to outside initiatives. Representatives of the secular perspectives include Palestinian intellectuals, dissenting Fatah insiders, and leftist groups. The Islamist perspective is represented by the Islamic Resistance Movement (often referred to by its Arabic acronym, Hamas), and Islamic Jihad. Certain Palestinian intellectuals criticized the PLO's position on the Gulf crisis on both moral and political grounds. They said the PLO's strategy during the crisis greatly damaged the organization's political credibility, and called on it to come out "publicly, repeatedly, and forcefully against the invasion of Kuwait and in favor of Iraqi withdrawal..." (Walid Khalidi, The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequence--Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991, pp. 22-23.) Other intellectuals, while not supportive of the PLO's policy during the crisis, proposed alternative approaches for the Palestinian movement. One of these approaches was based on the belief that a change in Palestinian politics was needed. The best way to accomplish this was to focus on how the United States could help promote lasting peace in the region. Those holding this view believed the Palestinians should obtain clarifications from the United States regarding its interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242 and guarantees that a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli settlement. They also said the United States should provide written assurances that during the transitional phase Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank would cease, and that sovereignty over land, water, the economy, and other matters would be in Palestinian hands. Leading Palestinian representatives, including Faisal al-Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi, repeatedly and consistently demanded such guarantees during their discussions with Secretary of State Baker. Palestinian intellectuals wanted the PLO to play a role in selecting the Palestinian delegation to the conference. However, when it became clear that the United States and Israel adamantly rejected such a role, many intellectuals concluded that substance was more important than procedure, even if it meant accepting a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation without PLO participation. Their position on this issue was in accordance with that of senior Fatah leaders, like Mohmoud Abbas, who argued that the PLO should allow the Palestinians living in occupied territories to negotiate a settlement with Israel. Palestinian political activists, both inside and outside the occupied territories, also joined the debate over alternatives. While all Palestinians have recognized the need for political reform, this time the call was voiced both inside and outside the PLO. Two proposals that have been developed stand out: internal reform and marhaliyyah, or the concept of stages in achieving a Palestinian state. The ideas of Radi al-Jarai and Khalid al-Hasan on internal reform deserve special mention. Jarai is a senior Fatah activist in the West Bank who writes for the pro-Fatah Jerusalem daily Al-Fajr. In his articles, Jarai has proposed that PLO institutions should be composed of both Palestinians in the occupied territories and those living outside them. To achieve this, Jarai has suggested the dissolution of the PNC, internationally supervised elections of new PNC delegates, and a provisional government or government-in-exile composed of an equal number of Palestinians from inside and outside the occupied territories. The intifada leaders have expressed similar ideas. Khalid al-Hasan, founder of Fatah and the head of the PNC's Foreign Affairs Committee, has promoted ideas like Jarai's that have the support of an important segment of Palestinian opinion. Besides calling for democratization and an end to what he called the "tyrannical line of Arafat," Hasan strongly recommended that the Palestinians form a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the peace conference and set up a provisional government. An independent Palestinian delegation, Hasan argued, would be incapable of achieving results in bilateral negotiations, even if it was accepted by Israel, for four reasons. First, the diplomatic balance would be overwhelmingly against it; second, Security Council Resolution 242 does not apply to the PLO, but to the occupied territory and by implication to Jordan; third, if Jordan attended the conference alone--and it was willing to do that if it had to--it would discuss only Jordan, not Palestine; fourth, for an independent delegation the maximum bargaining position would be self-rule, while for a joint delegation it would be the exchange of land for peace. In making these proposals, Hasan may have been motivated by a desire to challenge Arafat while Arafat was in a position of weakness. But regardless of his motive, his ideas on a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation found support in the PLO and in the occupied territories. The concept of marhaliyyah has also had a significant impact of Palestinian thinking. Since 1974 the Palestinians have demanded the establishment of a Palestinian state confederated with Jordan. In March 1991, the situation started to change. For the first time, some Palestinians in the occupied territories, notably Jarai, publicly advocated the idea of an interim phase before statehood. They dropped the word "autonomy" because it was associated with the restrictive interpretation of Israel's Likud government, which insisted that autonomy would apply to people but not to territory. Instead, Jarai and a few others used the term "self-government," or "self-governing arrangements," a phrase reportedly introduced by Baker and used in his letters of assurances to the Palestinians. Although the concept of marhaliyyah had stirred a heated debate among the Palestinians, a growing number of people, including senior PLO officials, concluded that it was in the interest of the Palestinians to accept an interim settlement. The diminished regional stature of the PLO and the galloping pace of Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank have made marhaliyyah a painful but acceptable option for many Palestinians, including many PLO leaders. Indeed, in April 1991, the PLO authorized the Palestinian delegation negotiating with Baker about participation in the peace conference to accept the idea of an interim phase without American or Israeli guarantees that the proposed phase would be followed by an independent Palestinian state. The Islamist Perspective Hamas and Islamic Jihad are the two main advocates of an Islamist alternative for the Palestinian struggle. Hamas was established in late 1987 as the political and military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group that has traditionally emphasized the completion of social reform and religious and moral education before waging armed struggle against the Israeli occupation. The intifada, however, has caused the Muslim Brotherhood to switch its focus and adopt an activist strategy of popular struggle. This process has been accelerated by its young and increasingly militant constituency. Islamic Jihad emerged in the early 1980's. It too, has young and militant members, who are motivated by religious and nationalist beliefs and who demand immediate armed struggle against the Israeli occupation. Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad are based in the occupied territories, but they have followers outside the territories. Hamas is the more popular group, claiming to represent one-third of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. Although Hamas and Islamic Jihad maintain independent institutions and political and social programs, they neither challenge the PLO's legitimacy nor claim to be alternatives to the PLO. However, they have increased their constituencies at the expense of secular PLO groups, including Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Equally significant, their advocacy of armed struggle and militant Islamism rivals the PLO's moderate program, which calls for compromise and a peaceful settlement with Israel. The key ideas propounded by Hamas shed light on the ethos and direction of the Islamist perspective. One of these is the organization's call for an escalation of the intifada. This means promoting armed struggle and resorting to more activist measures against the Israeli occupation, such as strikes and boycotts of Israeli products. Escalation underscores the mood of the Hamas constituency. Born and raised in the oppressive climate of the Israeli occupation and frustrated with a stagnant political process, Hamas sympathizers have concluded that militant activism is the only viable alternative. For these religious nationalists, the intifada is the Palestinian's only option. The PLO's policy of dialogue and non-violent resistance is considered futile. Hamas also calls for the total liberation of Palestine. Its demand is expressed in Islamic concepts depicting the Palestinian struggle as the "battle of the Islamic watan [homeland] with all its potential, resources, and civilization, against the Jews and their greed and machinations." To Hamas, participating in the peace process is nothing but a "sellout of Palestine and holy Jerusalem." In a world where the United States is the uncontested hegemon, according to Hamas, peace conferences are instruments designed to promote Israel's expansionist program and secure the capitulation of the Arab and Islamic worlds. Hamas calls for the formation of a new PNC through free UN-sponsored elections in the occupied territories. If elections cannot be held, Hamas argues, then as much as 40 percent of the 490 members of the PNC should be Hamas followers. While these demands may represent an interest in representative institutions, the more immediate and compelling objectives are more complex than that. The call for elections signals the start of a more assertive challenge to the PLO for control of the Palestinian resistance movement. The Hamas leadership may have decided that the cards were now stacked against the Arafat leadership because of its pro-Saddam position. On this score, Hamas policy during the Gulf crisis proved more pragmatic and forward-looking than that of the PLO. True, Hamas equated the fight against foreign powers in the Gulf (which it called Crusaders) with the Palestinian fight against Zionism, But the thrust of its policy was balanced. Anxious not to alienate the pro-Saddam Palestinians, Hamas demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Gulf and Iraqi troops from Kuwait; it also affirmed the right of the Kuwaiti people to self-determination and the selection of the government. The latter demand was made in part because of factors such as financial aid from Gulf countries, skepticism about Saddam Hussein's ability to liberate Palestine, and above all Hamas's belief that the future would be on its side if it distances itself from Iraq. Thus, with more of an eye on the growing influence of the Gulf states than an ear for pro-Saddam demonstrations on the Palestinian street, Hamas maintained its balanced position and in the process paid its dues to its Gulf benefactors. Several Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, quietly welcomed Hamas's position because they believed it would allow them to manipulate intra-Palestinian differences. Who Has Prevailed? These were the basic lines of thought that emerged among the Palestinians after the Gulf war. Which one has prevailed? So far, the views of the proactive forces of pragmatic nationalism have carried the day. Their vision was reflected in the political program of the September 1991 twentieth PNC, as well as the decision to accept the American-supported Israeli conditions for participation in the peace process. The PNC program was based on the following guidelines, all echoing the proposals of the proactive moderates. The guidelines show that the PLO has changed its position on key strategic issues. -- There should be an international peace conference. This position has changed. The new PNC program clearly states that with the current balance of power and new regional and international developments, the Palestinians have no realistic choice but to join in the United States-Soviet sponsored regional conference with Israel and the Arab states. -- The PLO should be an equal partner. This position has also changed. The program stipulates that the PLO has "the right to form the Palestinian delegation from within and outside the homeland, including Jerusalem," thus signaling that the PLO has dropped its insistence on the right to participate directly and visibly in the peace conference. -- Any solution should allow for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza confederated with Jordan. This demand is not mentioned even once in the new political program. At most, the program expresses the Palestinian desire to build future relations with Jordan "on the basis of a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Jordan." -- Autonomy is not a viable option. The PLO has also altered its position on this issue. The new PNC program explicitly endorses "provisional arrangements" that should include "the right of our people to sovereignty over land, water, natural resources, and all political and economic affairs." This means the PLO has accepted the spirit of the Camp David formula of autonomy, without necessarily endorsing the official Israeli interpretation of it as an interim phase, pending an agreement on the final status of the occupied Palestinian land. Other concessions the PLO made before the Gulf crisis have been upheld. These included the abandonment of armed struggle, the espousal of diplomacy, and the acceptance of UN Resolution 242. These concessions were unacceptable to certain Palestinian groups, including the leftist PFLP and DFLP, the Islamists, and the Damascus-based Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF). For the last two groups, the concessions not only represented the abandonment of Palestinian national rights in all of Palestine, "from the river to the sea," but also an ignominious capitulation to Israeli hegemony. The PFLP and DFLP also wanted direct PLO participation in the peace conference. They resented the formulation of a Palestinian delegation on the basis of Israeli conditions. Selecting Conference Delegates In his behind-the-scenes involvement in the selection of the delegation to the peace conference, Arafat used three criteria: family background, political affiliation, and geographic representation. An examination of the background of the members of the fourteen-member delegation indicates that they either were from high-status families or were political activists. Indeed, seven of the members either belonged to Fatah or were pro-Fatah, three were Communists, three were independents, and one was identified with the ABD Rabbah faction of the DFLP; none was from the PFLP or the Islamist delegates, who chose not to participate. Three of the six members who compose the advisory committee are from notable Jerusalem families with Fatah sympathies. In an attempt to represent the major Palestinian cities of the occupied territories, four of the delegates selected were from Gaza, three were from Nablus, three from Ramallah, two from Hebron, one from Bethlehem, and one from Jericho. When the PLO Central Council met in mid-October 1991, Arafat had to face the daunting task of overcoming the stiff opposition not only of the non-Fatah elements but also of some mainstream Fatah veterans. A "palace coup" almost took place as the dissenting Fatah veterans argued that the PLO should reassert its rights against Tel Aviv and Washington, otherwise Palestinian independence and national rights would be sacrificed at the conference. Many members of the opposition changed their views after reading an article by Bashir Barghuti, a leading Communist from the West Bank, that was published in the Jerusalem Arabic weekly Al-Taliah. Arafat read the article and realized that its simple but persuasive message had the potential to help the moderates overcome the opposition. In the article, Barghuti raised three points. First, the Palestinian delegation, regardless of its composition, would attend the peace conference not to surrender but to fight for Palestinian rights; the conference would be an "arena of struggle." Second, those who had reservations should devise a viable alternative in the form of a realistic and precise strategic concept, with a clear definition of their aims and methods to achieve those aims. Third, Barghuti proposed the formation of a steering committee that would include Palestinians from inside and outside the occupied territories; the committee would be responsible for coordinating and giving direction to the Palestinian negotiators at the conference. Arafat distributed copies of the article to the 78 participants at the Central Council meeting. He eventually persuaded the majority of them to accept the composition of the delegation. There is some concern that radicals may try to disrupt Palestinian participation in the peace process. The most serious threat comes from militant Islamists, who have publicly threatened members of the delegation. The best guarantee against the radicals is a genuine desire among all participants to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The New Palestinian Agenda The emerging system of Palestinian politics is not likely to be based on the old formula of total PLO dominance or to be exclusively derived from the expanding role of Palestinian activists in the occupied territories. Instead, it will rest on interaction between Palestinians in the occupied territories and those living in exile. This is about to become a reality. The new Palestinian agenda articulated at the twentieth PNC reflects the political preference of the proactive elements inside the occupied territories. The official Palestinian delegation to the Middle East peace conference was selected from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is supported by an advisory group composed of Palestinians from East Jerusalem and the diaspora. Together with the advisory group, the PLO will continue to unofficially co-manage the Palestinian delegation. For the Palestinians, attending the peace conference represents an opportunity and a challenge. It is an opportunity, since success at the conference could lead to their deliverance from the brutal realities of Israel's occupation. Indeed, the Palestinians have the strongest incentive to bring the conference to a successful conclusion because their very survival as a political community is at stake. The conference is also a challenge because the Palestinians believe they have made painful concessions of procedure; they hope for a better deal if and when agreements on interim self-government arrangements and the final status of the territories are reached. Their driving motivation is a compromise based on balance, fairness, and security for all. Faisal al-Husseini summed it up when he said, "We are fighting to free our people, not to enslave any other people. We are fighting to build our state, not to destroy any other state." [Muhammad Muslih--among his publications are The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) and From the Palestine War to the Gulf War: Palestinian Political Thought since 1948 (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, forthcoming). He is currently writing a book on Syria's foreign policy.] </body> </article> </text>